Contexte et cadre

Perspective

Afin de mettre dans une perspective adéquate l'implication de McDonald dans la controverse ovni, il est nécessaire de voir la controverse depuis son commencement. Encore cela est-il en soi une tâche difficile de par la complexité du sujet, convolué et rempli de demi vérités et contre-vérités ; il n'y a réellement aucune manière adéquate in which to adequately convey the flavor de la période de 1947 à 1965 dans un chapitre introductif n1Voir David Jacobs, The UFO Controversy in America, Indiana University Press, 1975, pour une excellente discussion de cette période. Mais il est possible de couvrir certains des événements importants et dans le processus de tenter de communiquer quelque chose de l'atmosphère qui infiltrait le sujet à l'époque où McDonald commença son travail en l'année suivante. Il semblerait que la meilleure manière de brièvement go about this est de commencer par présenter une discussion de la nature générale du phénomène rapporté depuis les alentours de 1947 puis d'indiquer la réponse qu'y a apporté la Force Aérienne, la communauté scientifique et le profane.

Le phénomène

Bien qu'il y ait eu des efforts pour relier le phénomène ovni post-2nde guerre mondiale avec les foo-fighters (boules lumineuses vues par les piltoes au combat) de la 2de guerre mondiale, la vague des airships de 1897, les récits médiévaux de choses vues dans le ciel et les événements miraculeux racontés dans la Bible n2Voir Jacques Vallée, Anatomy of A Phenomenon, H. Regnery Co., Chicago, 1965, for our purposes this kind of information is too esoteric and the links too tenuous for it to be relevant to setting the stage for McDonald's entrance. Nous pouvons nous contenter d'engager le sujet en 1947 lorsqu'il vint à l'attention du public américain suite à la publicité accordée à l'observation faite par Kenneth Arnold alors qu'il pilotait son avion au-dessus du Mont Rainier, dans l'état de Washington, le mardi 24. Arnold aurait vu 8 objets en forme de disque volant à une vitesse estimée à 1500 miles/h. La forme de disque, relativement semblable à une soucoupe inversée au sommet d'une soucoupe à l'endroit, devint rapidement le prototype de description à mesure que les signalements s'accumulaient. Bien sûr, de nombreuses autres formes et variations sur le prototype de la soucoupe, tout comme pour la lumière dans le ciel non identifiée, ont aussi été décrites.

J. Allen Hynek, Président du Département d'Astronomie de l'Université Northwestern, nous a fourni une typologie des signalements d'ovnis utile à obtenir une première appréhension des données. Sa typologie consiste en : lumières nocturnes, disques diurnes, signalements radar-visuels, rencontres rapprochées du 1er type, rencontres rapprochées du 2ᵉ type et rencontres rapprochées du 3ᵉ type.

Les Lumières Nocturnes sont les signalements d'ovnis les plus courants et consistent en des lumières non identifiées dans le ciel de nuit. En tant que classe de signalement ils sont numériquement grands, mais pas aussi significatifs en terme d'éléments concrets que les autres types. Hynek argue que s1J. Allen Hynek, The UFO Experience, H. Regnery, Inc., Chicago, 1972, p. 49 :

La Lumière Nocturne Typique est une lumière brillante, généralement pas une source ponctuelle, ou taille linéaire indéterminée et de couleur variable mais plus couramment jaune-orangée, bien qu'aucune couleur du spectre n'ait été absente de manière consistante, suivant une trajectoire non attribuable à un ballon, un avion ou un autre objet naturel et donnant souvent l'apparence d'une action intelligente. La lumière ne donne aucun indice direct d'être attachée à un corps solide mais pourrait éventuellement l'être.

Le Disques Diurne, d'un autre côté, fournit bien plus d'informations au chercheur s2Ibid, p. 67.

L'objet (souvent des objets par paire) est diversement décrit comme étant ovale, en forme de disque, "un cornichon stunted dill" et ellipsoïde. Il est généralement brillant ou luisant (mais presque jamais décrit comme ayant des lumières ponctuelles distinctes), jaunâtre, blanc ou métallique. Il montre dans la plupart des cas ce que nous décririons de manière anthropomorphique comme un mouvement dirigé "à dessein", avec la capacité d'accélérer extrêmement rapidement. Aucun son fort ou de rugissements ne semble être associé aux Disques Diurnes ; parfois il y a un léger bruit swishing.

As we move through the typology the evidence claims UFO researchers are prepared to make for their data increases. The Radar-Visual report consists of an observation made both with instrumentation and visually by one or more witnesses s3Ibid, p. 79 :

...it can be said that the radar operator observes a blip on his screen that, he avers, is definite, is akin to the type of blip given by a large aircraft, is not the result of malfunction, and does not resemble "weather phenomena." A visual sighting is characteristically a light, or possibly a formation of lights strikingly unfamiliar to the observer, with generally only a suggestion, if that, of an object dimly outlined by the brightness of the lights. The speeds involved are invariably high, but combinations of high speeds at one time and hovering at another are not uncommon. Reversals of motion and sharp turns, not abrupt 90-degree turns, are characteristic of Radar Visual cases.

Les cas de Rencontre Rapprochée sont les plus impressionnants du point de vue du chercheur. Une lumière brillante ou un objet est vu à moins de 500 pieds, parfois bien plus près de l'observateur, bien que dans les Rencontres Rapprochées du 1er Type il n'y ait pas d'interaction entre le percevant et le stimulus. Hynek décrit un prototype ainsi Ibid, p. 108 :

Une luminescence brillante, de taille relativement faible (de l'ordre de dizaines plutôt que de centaines de pieds), généralement de forme oval ? parfois surmontée d'un dôme ? absence d'ailes, roues conventionnelles ou autres protubérances, et capacité à stationner et à accélérer très rapidement à de hautes vitesses caractérisent l'ovni en rencontre rapprochée.

La Rencontre Rapprochée du 2ᵉ Type ne diffère pas de la Rencontre Rapprochée du 1er Type à l'exception que le stimulus intérragit avec l'environment d'une certaine manière et laisse des effets physiques. Hynek Indique s4Ibid, p. 110 :

Les effets physiques incluraient des marques tangibles sur le sol pouvant rester en évidence pendant des jours ou même des mois et viennent ostensiblement d'un contact physique de l'appareil avec le sol, the scorching or blighting de choses poussantes (particulièrement des plantes et des arbres), un malaise chez les animaux mis en évidence par leur comportement, et des effets physiques sur l'observateur humain tels qu'une paralysie temporaire, un engourdissement, une sensation de chaleur et autres malaises. Des interférences avec le champ gravitationnel local sont aussi parfois signalées, comme l'indiquent les signalements par certains observateurs de sensations temporaires de lourdeur ou d'autres effets inertiels, comme si les lois bien connues de l'inertie avaient été temporairement abrogées.

One remarkable reported physical effect involves interference in electrical circuits, causing car engines to cease functioning temporarily, radios to cut out or to exhibit uncommon static, car headlights to dim or be extinguished for a short while, and, on occasion, car batteries to overheat and deteriorate rapidly.

La Rencontre Rapprochée du 3ᵉ Type est encore plus bizarre, car elle implique le signalement de la présence d'une créature animée dans le cadre de l'observation d'ovni. Hynek ne fournit pas much of a prototype, il indique s6Ibid, p. 161 :

Elles ne diffèrent des autres rencontres rapprochées que par définition, par la présence signalée d'occupants (dans ou près de l'appareil) et par le fait que ces rencontres ne sont pas aussi souvent signalées par des gens sophistiqués et de haute formation que les autres rencontres rapprochées.

Jusqu'à ce point les aspects qualitatifs du phénomène ont reçu une attention. Tournons-nous maintenant vers le quantitatif. Ci-contre est un tableau indiquant le nombre d'observations de tous types rapportées à l'Air Force de 1947 à 1965. Ces rapports sont presque exclusivement d'origine domestique, mais quelques-uns venus de bases américaines à l'étranger sont également inclus (voir tableau 1). Ceci ne signifie pas que le phénomène est en lui-même principalement domestique, au contraire il est de portée globale. Cependant, la communication internationale sur le problème et la connaissance de la recherche étrangère en elle-même sont si limités qu'il est sage à ce point de traiter le vécu américain en isolation. Il est suffisant de dire que des signalements de la même sorte de données existent à travers le monde.

Bien que la typologie de Hynek englobe cet aspect du phénomène ovni qu'il considère représenter des données légitimes, il existe une autre composante du problème que la plupart des enquêteurs considèrent illégitime, mais qui parce qu'elle est si bizarre a reçu plus que sa part d'attention et en conséquence, selon de nombreux chercheurs sur les ovnis, a eut un effet disproportionné et dévaforable sur l'étude du problème des ovnis. Il s'agit de la question des contactés.

La question des contactés

Hynek a parlé d'occupants dans son prototype de la Rencontre Rapprochée du 3ᵉ Type. Cependant, il était peu disposé à entertain des rapports de contactés. Dans le lexique d'Ufologie ce dernier consiste en des observations, mais pas d'interactions avec, d'occupants d'ovnis, tandis que le dernier consiste en une interaction définie avec les occupants, souvent de nature religieuse ou semi-religieuse et incluant souvent des déclarations de voyages sur d'autres planètes et/ou assertions que les observateurs eux-mêmes soient d'autres planètes. The circus-type atmosphere which these reports created flourished in the 1950s and continues to exist to some degree. Quelques-uns des contactés les plus connus furent George Adamski, Truman Bethurum, Daniel Fry, Orfeo Angelucci, Howard Menger et Gabriel Green. Ils écrivirent tous des livres et/ou des suites basées sur les messages extraterrestres ou de doom ou de salut qu'ils proferraient n3Voir Jacobs pour une excellente discussion du contexte de ces hommes et les croyances qu'ils ont mis en avant. Ils ont attiré une grande attention et regardless du mérite des données énumérées par Hynek, des données dont des enquêteurs sérieux sur les ovnis déclaraient, et qui étaient, anormales, les cultes de contactés distrayaient l'intérêt de ces données et augmentaient la probabilité que la communauté scientifique voit la question des ovnis comme un problème absurde et ne le soumette pas à un examen rigoureux.

La réponse de l'Air Force

Peu après les observations d'ovnis américaines initiales en juin 1947 l'Air Force en tant que défenseur de l'espace aérien américain prit la responsabilité d'examiner le problème et de déterminer si ces événements comprométaient la sécurité nationale des États-Unis. Parce que les premières observations faites en l'année d'avant avaient été au-dessus de la Suède la peur existait qu'il s'agisse en fait d'essais de missiles russes qui auraient pu, s'ils avaient une portée intercontinentale, changer l'aspect de la guerre froide embryonaire.

L'Air Force maintenu la seule responsabilité officielle d'expliquer les données ovnis entre l'année suivante à 1969. Des volumes pourraient être écrits sur ce seul sujet. Cependant, un tel détail n'est pas nécessaire pour les objectifs de cette étude. Ce qui est important est que l'Air Force fournit du personnel pour un petit projet d'enquête qui de 1947 à 1949 fut appelé projet Sign, de 1949 à 1951 fut nommé projet Grudge et de 1952 à 1969 porta le nom de code de projet Blue Book. Les rapports et communiqués de presse de chacun des projets assurèrent le public que les observations n'étaient une menace pour la sécurité nationale et pouvaient être expliquées par de mauvaises interprétations d'étoiles, de planètes et objets de fabrication humaine, ou étaient des phénomènes naturels, ou des canulars s7United States Air Force Air Material Command, Unidentified Aerial Objects; Project Sign, Dayton, Ohio, W.P.A.F.B., 1948 - United States Air Force Air Material Command, Unidentified Flying Objects; Project Grudge, Dayton, Ohio, W.P.A.F.B., 1949 - Communiqué de presse assortis de Blue Book, 1951-1965. L'Air Force adhéra à cette position publique pendant 22 ans jusqu'à la clôture de Blue Book en 1969.

L'Air Force fit ses déclarations sur un fond de déclarations qu'elle le fit après une enquête minutieuse des observations avec l'aide de certains des talents scientifiques les plus fins de l'Amérique. L'implication pour des membres de la communauté scientifique devint évidente. L'Air Force, à travers l'utilisation du muscle scientifique suffisant à sa disposition, pouvait facilement expliquer les observations d'ovnis qui rendaient perplexe le néophyte sans formation.

La réponse académique

Pour le scientifique praticien cela signifiait que tout travail supplémentaire sur le problème n'était pas nécessaire. Cette attitude reçu un renforcement supplémentaire dans les années 1950s par le seul traité académiquement produit sur le sujet. Un astronome réputé de Harvard, Donald Menzel, produit un volume intitulé Flying Saucers s8Donald Menzel, Flying Saucers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953. Menzel poursuivit son travail sur les ovnis d'une manière très différente de celle qu'il utilisait en astronomie. Plutôt que d'essayer d'expliquer les observations en enquêtant dessus, c'est-à-dire, en interrogeant les témoins, cherchant des causes possibles à chaque événement, etc., il rédigea un livre contenant des exemples des diverses manières par lesquelles l'atmosphère pouvait produire un phénomène brillant semblable à une sphère ou de forme elliptique qui pouvait tromper l'observateur sans formation. En faisant cela il produisit l'équivalent d'un texte d'optique atmosphérique pour le néophyte. Cependant, il ne se confrota jamais aux données ; il n'offrit que des explications possibles en supposant que les ovnis étaient un problème absurde. Néanmoins, son livre devint le travail universitaire définitif sur le sujet pendant les années 1950s et en tant que tel avait un poids considérable parmi les scientifiques.

En 1963 il le fit suivre d'un second livre intitulé The World of Flying Saucers écrit avec Lyle Boyd s9Donald Menzel & Lyle Boyd, The World of Flying Saucers, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1963. Il le rédigea dans la même veine, traitant la totalité du phénomène ovni comme une pseudoscience absurde. Cependant, Menzel se rapprocha des données, pas à travers une enquête personnelle des cas, mais en obtenant un accès et en expliquant les rapports d'ovnis officiels de l'Air Force des fichiers du projet Blue Book. Ce livre ensconced further Menzel comme la parole académique définitive sur le sujet des ovnis.

En conséquence, avant 1966 les universitaires firent très peu pour élucider le problème ovni. 2 groupes sur les ovnis, le Comité National d'Enquêtes sur les Phénomènes Aériens (NICAP) et l'Organisation de Recherche sur les Phénomènes Aériens (APRO) utilisèrent des scientifiques et des ingénieurs comme enquêteurs, mais aucun ne fit un effort concerté pour examiner les données. 2 exceptions possibles à cette généralisation, cependant, furent J. Allen Hynek, à l'Université Northwestern, et son protégé Jacques Vallée. Parce que Hynek commença son travail de conseil pour l'Air Force avec le projet Sign en 1948 et maintint cette relation jusqu'en 1969 il put claim closer ties to the UFO phenomenon than any other scientist. Yet, regardless of what he believed about the significance of the observations during those years. Ce ne fut pas avant 1966 qu'il commença à prendre publiquement position sur le fait que les données méritaient un examen plus attentif. D'un autre côté, Jacques Vallée tout en étant ostensiblement le protégé de Hynek écrivait considérablement plus sur le phénomène ovni. En l'année d'avant il publia Anatomy of a Phenomenon s10Jacques Vallée, Anatomy of a Phenomenon, H. Regnery Co., Chicago, 1965 et en l'année suivante avec sa femme Janine il penned Challenge to Science; the UFO Enigma s11Jacques & Janine Vallée, Challenge to Science; the UFO Enigma, H. Regnery Co., Chicago, 1966. Dans les 2 volumes il adopta un regard plus systématique sur le problème des ovnis qu'il ne l'avait auparavant tenté et tenta d'intéresser la communauté scientifique à l'examen des données. Néanmoins, à toutes fins pratiques il n'y eut pas de recherche sur les ovnis au sein de la communauté scientifique avant 1966.

La réponse publique

La réponse which the phenomenon evoked from the public proved detrimental to scientific activity in the short run, but if the data should prove anomalous, will be very important to the scientific response in the long run. This is because the public in the form of various authors, UFO groups and charlatans initially helped to frighten off rigorously trained investigators, yet these same individuals kept the UFO question alive, chronicled the data, and overcame Air Force efforts to inter the subject.

L'ancien major des Marines Donald Keyhoe began it all in 1949 and developed into the most influential layman in the area. He published an article in True Magazine for December 1949 in which he claimed there was more to the UFO problem than the Air Force claimed and hypothesized an extraterrestrial explanation s12Donald Keyhoe, "The Flying Saucers are Real," True Magazine, décembre 1949, pp. 17-21. Thus Keyhoe gave extensive exposure to both the extraterrestrial and conspiracy hypotheses. He elaborated on these ideas in books which appeared in l'année suivante s13The Flying Saucers are Real, Fawcett Publications, New York, 1950, 1953 s14Keyhoe, Flying Saucers from Outer Space, Holt, New York, 1953, 1955 s15Donald Keyhoe, The Flying Saucer Conspiracy. Holt, New York, 1955, et 1960 s16Keyhoe, Flying Saucers: Top Secret. Putnam, New York, 1960. Each one enjoyed good sales which helped make the UFO problem a topic of general conversation. Of course, Keyhoe was not alone. Scores of authors wrote UFO books in the period 1950-1965, but Keyhoe remained the most authoritative sounding as a result of his Pentagon connections, and probably the most widely read.

Many privately funded UFO organizations were formed during this time, however, only two still survive. The Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (APRO) began in 1952 under the direction of Coral Lorenzen, while the National Investigation Committee on Aerial Phenomena (NICAP) formed in 1956 with Harrison Brown as its head. Both functioned primarily as repositories for UFO sighting reports while they attempted to obtain a hearing for the data before the scientific community. Each recruited individuals on an international basis to investigate sightings and forward the ensuing reports to national headquarters; for APRO Tucson, Arizona, and for NICAP Washington, D.C. The NICAP group reorganized under the leadership of Donald Keyhoe (1956-1969), attacked the Air Force vigorously and constantly lobbied on Capitol Hill for Congressional Hearings on the UFO question. On the other hand, the APRO leadership, recognizing the inadvisability of trying to attack the Air Force from its remote Tucson base of operations, concentrated instead on fostering an image of a research-oriented organization. In fact, neither group did much research other than that done by the field investigators. Investigators wrote up and filed reports running into the tens of thousands over the years, but due to a lack of funds the research endeavor never went much further. Consequently, the groups developed their data bases, published newsletters and made very few converts in the scientific community.

The contactees referred to above, along with various charlatans and hucksters, did much harm to the attempt to acquire scientific legitimacy for the UFO phenomenon. The relatively quiet, by and large non-sensational, efforts of NICAP and APRO took a back seat to the bizarre tales of those individuals only interested in making a fast dollar from the excitement generated by UFO reports. As a result as time passed the first thought that crossed people's minds when the subject of UFOs arose was little green men. This was obviously the last thing on the minds of the few serious researchers in the field, but it is representative of the type of image that had to be altered if the scientific community was going to consider the subject a legitimate topic of inquiry.

Therefore, we can see that between 1947 à 1965 there were a number of factors working to keep UFO data from undergoing scientific scrutiny. The Air Force had consistently written the matter off for 18 years. With these assurances, as well as those from Donald Menzel of Harvard, most scientists found no need to delve further into the problem. Moreover, this conclusion was additionally reinforced by the conspiracy claims of Keyhoe and various contactee and charlatan assertions which most reasonable men viewed as fraudulent.

Le problème

Briefly elucidating these salient aspects of pre-1966 UFO lore prepares us to embark on our case study in the strategy and practice of borderland science. I suspect what is observed in this instance is a slightly exaggerated version of the manner in which "/science as usual" is conducted. This exaggeration appears to have two causes. The first concerns the perquisites of the scientific profession which are at stake. That is, if UFO data achieved respectability the scientists responsible, particularly if the hypothèse extraterrestre (HET) were assumed, would never have to go begging for research funds again. The second cause for exaggeration involves the restructuring of world views necessary to accommodate the hypotheses generally advanced to explain UFO data by those who believe it has significant scientific and social import. In other words, the ramifications of accepting UFO sightings as new observational data are much greater than those customarily encountered by the scientist in his daily work. Viewed as a political problem it is concerned with how scientists interact when confronted with a potentially anomalous phenomenon and at the same time it raises the issues both of how knowledge grows and of who gets what, when, where and how in the scientific community?

Le terme de "phénomène anormal" est utilisé ici faute de mieux. D'ordinaire une observation anormale est one which does not fit into existing theories or frameworks of analysis. What is denoted here is a special case within this class. It is an observation which, according to Kuhn, is potentially a cause of a paradigmatic shift in whatever discipline it occurs s17Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. To accommodate it, entire world views must be revised, it is not enough to "fudge a little" or extend already extant conceptions of reality. These conceptions must undergo extensive revision or be shelved entirely. This distinction between the routine and the revolutionary discovery is made explicit by Blackwell. The routine discovery is made within the confines of previously established knowledge, while the revolutionary discovery is made outside these confines and results in a genuine upheaval of scientific thinking s18Richard J. Blackwell, Discovery in the Physical Sciences, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971, pp. 53, 54. When the possibility of such an event is in the offing the politics of science associated with it tends to become more visible.

La politique de la science

Political scientists generally conceive of the politics of science in terms of the relationships between government and science. The areas of principal emphasis have been the impact of government on science, the scientist as decision-maker, and the scientist and foreign policy. A few examples should serve to illustrate this.

A number of studies speak to the question of government impact on science. Price discusses the problems arising from the growth of the federally funded post World War II scientific establishment s19Donald K. Price, The Scientific Estate, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, while Reagan examines the funding policies of the federal government with respect to scientific research s20Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron, London: Oxford University Press, 1969. In the same area Knorr and Morgenstern address themselves to policy questions related to the management of military research and development in the United States s21Klaus Knorr et Oskar Morgenstern, "Science and Defense: Some Critical Thoughts on Military Research and Development," Policy Memorandum No. 32, February 18, 1965, Princeton University.

Several authors treat the scientist as a decision-maker. In this respect Wohlstetter considers the effect scientists have on decisions concerning national and international security s22Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seers and Strategy," Foreign Affairs. April 1963, pp. 220-35] and Schilling explores President Truman's decision to pursue development of the H-Bomb s23[Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision -- How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science Quarterly, March 1961, pp. 58-70. Gilpin directs his inquiry to the dispute which developed in the scientific community over the nuclear test ban treaty s24Robert Gilpin, "The Intra-Scientific Conflict Over a Nuclear Test Ban: The Problem of Conflicting Expertise," in Robert Gilpin, ed., American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 251-78, while the influence of scientists on policy-making in the executive branch is appraised by Schooler s25Dean Schooler, Jr., Science, Scientists, and Public Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1971.

With regard to foreign policy Schilling outlines the recent history of the scientist in the policy-making process s26Warner R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics," The American Political Science Review, June 1962, pp. 287-300 et Skolnikoff illustrates the importance of scientific input to the Department of State decision-making process s27[Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Scientific Advice in the State Department," Science. 25 novembre 1966, pp. 980-85. Lastly, Nelson uses a study of the Pugwash Conference to indicate the increased sensitivity on the part of scientists to international politics s28William R. Nelson, "Pugwash: The Scientific Conscience and International Politics," in William R. Nelson, ed. The Politics of Science, London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

La politique personnelle de la science

On the other hand, the personal politics of science encompasses the everyday interaction of scientists. This approach stresses the interpersonal strategies invoked by scientists in the pursuit of knowledge. It fleshes out the skeleton of scientific research to provide insights into the social processes underlying the formal outcomes which are found in scholarly journals and texts. In so doing this personal politics of science brings one to a better understanding of both the context of discovery and validation. Unlike the traditional politics of science it is concerned with the micro-analysis of the behavior of scientists. Although governmental and scientific institutions play a role, the primary actors in such analyses are the scientists themselves. The point of such endeavors is to break out of the time-honored myth which portrays the scientist as a disinterested observer who, with respect to his research, is neutral both in the laboratory and in the world.

For example, DeGrazia chronicles the treatment given Emmanuel Velikovsky and his work by the scientific community. He concentrates on the interactions of Velikovsky with his critics, the scientific journals, book publishers and other academics s29Alfred DeGrazia, ed., The Velikovsky Affair. New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1966, pp. 171-232. This personal approach to the politics of science is also utilized by Greenberg. He takes advantage of the knowledge he acquired as an assistant editor of Science to explicate the history of the politics of what he calls pure science in the United States. He places emphasis on the period just prior to World War II through 1965 in a discussion directed toward which scientists wanted what projects, where, and why s30Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science, New York: The World Publishing Company, 1967. In a similar (personal) vein Barber points out that while literature exists which explores political, technological, economic and religious resistance to new ideas in science, virtually none probes resistance to new discoveries on the part of scientists themselves. He goes on to provide examples of this phenomenon s31Bernard Barber, "Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery," Science, September 1, 1961, pp. 596-606.

La croissance du savoir

There is another stream of literature which converges on these same problems from the perspective of the sociology and history of science. It is concerned with the manner in which knowledge grows s32Much of the following discussion relies upon Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. The building bloc notion has been generally accepted until quite recently. In essence this hypothesis suggests that knowledge grows progressively and incrementally, each new idea following logically from that which has gone before. However, this is not the only position in the literature. According to Kroeber it is the exhaustion of ideas in one area of research which leads to new problems or orientations and the concomitant growth of knowledge s33A. L Kroeber, Style and Civilizations, lthaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957. The identical outcome is produced by a series of "micro-revolutions" if the argument of Toulmin is accepted. He claims that old theories are not discarded in crisis periods, as Kuhn would have us believe, but rather changes are made in the basic assumptions. Later the "so-called" old theories are reintroduced or surface in other disciplines s34S. Toulmin, "Conceptual Revolutions in Science," In R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky, eds., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company, Vol. 3, pp. 331-347.

The concept of growth accepted by Crane s35Crane, passim. and Ziman s36[J.M. Ziman, Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968 is that of Kuhn s37Kuhn, passim. which was later reinterpreted by Masterman s38M. Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave, eds.. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969, pp. 59-89 and thus accepted by Kuhn s39Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, passim last chapter. Kuhn asserts that periods of science-as-usual, what he calls normal science, are interspersed with periods of crisis and then revolution. Once a revolution occurs a paradigm develops in a discipline, or a part thereof, which attracts scientists to it and permits normal science to continue again. Crisis is precipitated by problems insoluble within the old paradigm. Revolution is the "breaking out" of the old paradigm and the formation of a new one in order to resolve crisis-causing problems. The definition of paradigm is not clear, but Masterman presents three usages gleaned from Kuhn's work:

1. metaphysical, a world view
2. sociological, a universally recognized scientific achievement
3. an artifact or construct which provides tools for specific problem-solving

Beyond the range of all of these usages anomalies may occur which could lead to crisis within a discipline and eventual revolution. The growth of knowledge, then, is portrayed as a cyclical process.

An aspect of this process which the proponents of all of these hypotheses fail to entertain is the political component. Although Crane comes close, by citing the cognitive and social constituents of knowledge growth s40Crane, passim., and Kuhn even uses the revolutionary analogy to describe his paradigm shift s41Kuhn (Second Edition), passim., they nonetheless neglect the political.

It is at that point where this research takes advantage of both the personal politics of science literature and the growth of knowledge hypotheses to suggest how scientific growth, of a revolutionary nature, occurs, not only at the abstract level of theory, but also at the real world level of the scientific arena. The Kuhnian model of growth seems potentially the most appropriate to the UFO phenomenon. It has an appeal regardless of which conception of paradigm one chooses to adopt. For it is a paradigm shift which is necessary, if the UFO phenomenon is truly anomalous, to transform the scientific climate of opinion toward the subject and foster interest in it. Either a change in world view, a critical experiment, or some application of new, or heretofore unused, instrumentation for observational purposes, is required to change the research picture vis-a-vis the subject. This is necessary because research cannot go forward as long as the subject is deemed illegitimate.

Le processus scientifique en tant que processus politique

To understand the efforts which have been made in this direction it is constructive to conceive of the scientific process as a political process. While this is heresy to the positivist, it is fundamental to bridging the gap between paradigms. As Kuhn points out there is always resistance to new ideas from the old guard. In some instances it is overcome, in others the younger generation of scientists is forced to wait for the older generation to die off before acceptance of the new ideas can occur. However, Kuhn does not give much consideration to the nature of the struggle to obtain acceptance. The struggle results from the incommensurability of the old and the new paradigm. Each carries with it a set of criteria for evidence claims and acceptable methods of validation. Unfortunately, the criteria and methods of the new paradigm may not be admissible under the standards of the old. Since the latter has proven itself many times in the past and its adherents, who are legion, have world views and careers securely anchored within it, resistance to the new paradigm develops. Yet, because the standard bearers, of each do not accept one another's basic assumptions about the world and/or how to do research they can only talk at, not with, one another; intersubjectively verifiable claims are not possible because the followers of each approach speak different languages. When such a situation exists the outcome becomes a matter of persuading those of the old school to accept the new. Kuhn is cognizant of this and points out that proponents of the new paradigm try to make their case by showing that their paradigm solves the problems which had previously caused a crisis, predicts further unexpected solutions to other problems and is more aesthetically pleasing than its predecessor. However, Kuhn does not see this as a political process and does not elaborate on it.

In fact, he admits that the research which could throw light on the conversion question has not been done. I believe this attempt to gain acceptance can usefully be viewed as politicking, often in a revolutionary way, for purposes of securing an assenting constituency. These behaviors, and those related to them, constitute the personal politics of science of this study.

Le processus scientifique et la méthode scientifique

We are well under way to grasping this concept if we define the scientific process as any and all behaviors engaged in by scientists to further their science-related interests. This is a considerable embellishment of the concept of scientific method which is usually used interchangeably with scientific process. When traditionally used it consists of an objective scientist hypothesizing an outcome, doing an experiment, collecting the resulting data, interpreting the outcome and writing up the findings for publication. The result of the above expanded definition, on the other hand, is to suggest that science consists of much more than what scientists do in their labs or report in books and journal articles. The scientific process viewed as a political process does not conceive of the scientist as neutral, but rather as an advocate. He has a position with respect to the problems he studies, possibly to a greater extent on controversial issues, and he desires to promulgate this position. Therefore, he engages in behaviors which he believes will foster his substantive findings, argumentation and other research ends. These behaviors are political and constitute the tactics of the strategy which he feels will best serve to resolve the issue which is at stake. This view, then, enlarges the repertoire of activities which comprise the scientific process and makes it possible to speak of the scientist as a political actor

This orientation has certain distasteful aspects to some. For instance, it makes the behaviors associated with the scientific method, namely those enumerated above, a subset of the behaviors included in the scientific process. The figure which appears below serves to illustrate this. The schematic itself is the scientific process. It consists of the scientific method represented by the behaviors in the inner box and the associated political activities shown peripherally outside the inner box. The latter are not intended to be all inclusive, but should serve as a useful heuristic.

Another difficulty with this enlarged conception of the scientific process is that it permits individuals other than scientists to participate. This implication should not be interpreted as a covert means of legitimating as scientific the actions of those who take part in the scientific process, but who are not scientists; for this is not the intention of the definition. An individual can be a party to the scientific process without the necessity that the inference be drawn, either that he is a scientist, or that his work is scientific. For these labels are reserved for the professional scientist in the first instance and for anyone who adheres to the scientific method in the second instance.

The elaboration of the normal scientific process definition is a means to a better understanding of the personal politics of science. Informally it has existed since the first scientist penned a biography. In reading The Double Helix s42James D. Watson, The Double Helix. A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA, New York: Antheneum, 1968 or Lawrence and Oppenheimer s43Nuel P. Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, for instance, all of the above is implicit, but not elaborated. The McDonald UFO case study which follows is a detailed examination of selected aspects of one man's attempt to force a paradigm shift on the American scientific community. The ramifications would have been of major import to society if McDonald had proved successful. Few areas of life would have remained unaffected, at least in the industrialized world; space budgets, military budgets, priorities at all levels would have undergone reassessment along with life styles, careers, and cosmological orientations. That McDonald failed is not to say that he was wrong, nor that the issue is no longer joined. Neither is it to imply that he was correct and championed an idea whose time had not come. The UFO phenomenon is a thorny issue, not readily amenable to scientific investigation; the controversy continues, but is smoldering, rather than burning. Only time will tell if James McDonald pursued, in his own words, the most important scientific problem of our time, or a will-o'-the-wisp.

In either case, a great deal can be learned about the behavior of scientists when paradigms are at stake from the analysis of his attempt to legitimate the study of the UFO phenomenon. In particular, we can better understand, at least in this case, how a scientist tried to bridge the chasm between an old and a potentially new paradigm.