Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here today - I'm over here (laughs). Thank you so much for being here. I want to get into specifics here. And the reason I'm going to go this way is because you've talked a bit about what I would call misdirection by official US government with regard to UAPs. Right. And so I'm going to get to that in a second. But last week, White House NSC spokesman John Kirby stated that UAPs are having an impact on our training ranges and need to be treated as a legitimate issue. Do you concur with the statements that's for each of you?
David Grusch: Yes.
Ryan Graves: Yes.
David Fravor: Yes.
Okay. Now, having said that, I'm going to take you to specific instances around the Phoenix Valley because that's where I live. In 1997, we had the famous Phoenix Light case. I don't know if any of you are familiar with that? There were two things that went along with that and the explanation was military training range off Luke and the Barry Goldwater range. Do you know anything different other than the official explanation of those lights?
Only what's in the public vernacular about it that was outside the scope of my duties.
And if we wanted to just my question, along with my colleague from New York, Miz Ocasio Cortez, if we wanted to find out more about that, where would we go to find the files and who would we address? And are you going to tell me we need to go to a SCIF so you can tell us in a SCIF?
I could potentially give you a vector on that. That specific mean, I'm familiar with it in terms of public, but I give you a vector in closed environment.
Yeah, that would be good. Thank you. So if it's true that UAPs are having an impact on training ranges and this administration considers it to be a legitimate issue, what steps can Congress take to address training range impacts? And I say that having two very large training ranges in my state. And so we'll start with Mr. Graves on going down the panel.
Some of the initial procedures have been implemented, such as within the United States Navy that have a range follow report that gathers information from pilots. I understand that a service wide reporting mechanism is still pending. However, that would be a great next step, not only for gathering information, but for showing the troops that is an acceptable topic and reducing the stigma.
Okay. Please, all of you, continue.
Grusch: Yeah. As a recipient of a lot of those training range reports, sometimes we only get contextual kind of oral reporting. It'd be nice if they attached all sensor data and there's a system in place that can handle multiple classifications of data. And that's an issue with the F-35. Right. That jet was never built to be an ISR platform, and it's a pain in the we'll say butt to get that data off.
Fravor: Great, thank you. Yeah, I would agree with the previous two, being a user of those training ranges, that the data has to be out there. You have to acknowledge that you're seeing them and then you have to collect the data. Right now, you get the report, someone says, I saw something, but no one collects the radar data to back it up and do research.
Okay. Do you believe that the 2019 classification guidelines for UAPs interferes with the federal government's ability to be transparent with the American people? And do you think we need to be more transparent with the American people? All of you, Yeah.
Graves I'll say yes to that.
Grusch: Yeah. I'm familiar with at least the UAP task Force 2019 security classification guide. I think it's fair. I did actually help author that with the...
You got a bias that way then (laugh)
But I will say I'll call it a lazy attitude about declassifying videos. I mean, I've seen some of the videos of the recent shootdown and I saw no reason that couldn't have been released. As long as they mask some data, the American people deserve to see that imagery and full motion video.
Fravor: I would think. Well, in my opinion, I will say that are overclassified. I know for a fact the video or the pictures that came out in the 2020 report that had the stuff off the East Coast, they were taken with an iPhone off the East Coast. A buddy of mine was one of the senior people there, and he said they were originally classified as TSSCI. And my question to him was, what's TSSCI about these? They're an iPhone literally off the vacates. That's not TSSCI. So they're overclassified. And as soon as they do that, they go in a vault and then you all have to look for them.
Yeah so, with the overclassification, that may be one way. Are there other ways that the DoD or intelligence agencies are keeping this information from the American people or even from Congress?
I think part of that has been not encouraging reporting. If the problem is not something that can be measured, it's not something that's going to be fixed.
Okay, very good. Well, I'm out of time. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.