Cet article a présenté une prise au sérieux de l'HCT comme explication potentielle des PAN, tout en notant qu'elle est probablement moins bien évaluée que d'autres hypothèses, telle que l'explication extraterrestre, bien que ces calculs sont difficiles à quantifier. Pour être précis, le matériel ci-avant contient 4 HCTs différentes. Toutes impliqueraient des entités existant de manière furtive durant l'histoire humaine récente – et même peut-être avant l'émergence de l'Homo sapiens dans certains cas, comme l'HCT 2 – mais diffèrent quant à la nature des êtres en question.
We might note that, in his detailed taxonomy of PAN hypotheses, Nell also offered four HCTs: ancient / proto-human survival; breakaway civilization; cryptids / humanoids; and stranded “Gods.” Thus, we can see some subtle classificatory differences between the two schemas. Although we share our HCT 2 in common (namely, hominid or theropod cryptoterrestrials), the remainder differ subtly: arguably, HCT 1 and 2 in his taxonomy are both variables of our HCT 1; although our HCT 3, involving extraterrestrial or extratempestrial beings, does feature in his taxonomy, he does not categorize these as cryptoterrestrials per se; similarly, with regard to our HCT 4, while some of his hypotheses could be interpreted as “magical,” he also does not file these within the cryptoterrestrial category; conversely, while we are open to the idea of “stranded Gods,” we have not considered these as being situated within the cryptoterrestrial category. However, classificatory nuances aside, it is interesting to see our own taxonomy – which we prepared before and without knowledge of Nell’s schema – share considerable similarities with his.
Finally, in closing, it’s worth comparing these HCTs to assess their relative strengths in explaining PAN. HCTs 1-2 have the advantage over the extraterrestrial hypothesis (ETH) of not having to appeal to interstellar space travel – an extraordinary technological feat for any species – to account for PAN. Nonetheless, HCTs 1-3 suffer from some of the same weaknesses as the ETH, as well as several which are unique to them. For instance, if the cryptoterrestrials belong to a human (or hominid or theropod) civilization with advanced technology, we would still have to explain how their craft seem to defy physical laws (e.g., speeds and rates of acceleration which seem very likely to kill anything living), as well as why the remnants of an advanced past civilization haven’t yet been discovered despite our broad temporal and geographic archaeological and paleoanthropological knowledge. And HCTs 1-2 presumably cannot explain this away by appealing to the builder’s discovery of, e.g., some as-yet-unknown super-resilient substance, since they live on the same planet as us. Furthermore, if the cryptoterrestrials belong to a conventional but highly advanced civilization, it seems reasonable to wonder why they have chosen to remain hidden from humans for so long. The ETH can at least posit that, e.g., we’ve only recently been visited by aliens for the first time, perhaps by a small number of outriding scouts with orders not to interfere too boldly. But on HCTs 1-2, this silence seems more puzzling still, particularly since the cryptoterrestrials would be, ex hypothesi, both our longtime neighbors and by far our technological superiors.
The principal weakness of HCT 4, by contrast, is its utter strangeness, particularly for readers schooled to limit themselves to modes of explanation within the bounds of, say, the standard model of physics. While belief in extraterrestrials is tenable, belief in (something like) fairies is simply not a live option for many scientists. On the other hand, this weakness might equally and paradoxically be HCT 4’s principal strength: accepting that explaining PANs will require (as Quine, 1951, once wrote in a very different context) “swelling ontology to simplify theory.” Given the apparent implausibility of explaining at least some aspects of PAN by reference to beings much like ourselves, just more advanced in relevant respects, HCT 4 (like the ultraterrestrial hypothesis more broadly) explains them in terms of beings so unlike ourselves that we have to resort to words like “magic” and “supernatural” to account for them, especially considering labels like fairies, elves, angels, nymphs, etc. were ascribed at a time that predates rapid scientific progress and our more recent ability to understand previously “magical” encounters in more conventional terms. In other words, considering our historic and prehistoric ancestors likely interacted with this same phenomenon, current humans are undoubtedly better placed to comprehend such advancements, less as magic, but as a result of continued evolution of both technology and consciousness. HCT 4 is unlike the interdimensional ultraterrestrial hypothesis in that it sees the agents of PAN as in some sense at home on Earth – trolls and fairies would be terrestrial and perhaps even social or cultural beings in a way that angels and demons seem not to be. But, indeed, HCT 4 also suggests that, if human traditions are to be trusted, these beings have never been fully hidden from us, with people in all times and places reporting encounters with something like magical cryptoterrestrials, even though they don’t appear to (or can’t be seen by) most people.
All four HCTs are far-fetched on their face; we entertain them here because some aspects of PAN are strange enough
that they seem to call for unconventional explanations. Most investigations of PAN to-date have focused on the ETH,
which does have several lines of evidence in its favor . Nonetheless, the ETH does not exhaust the
possible accounts of PAN. Given how little is known about these strange phenomena, it seems prudent to keep every line
of inquiry – including the various HCTs – in play. Indeed, this is a fitting summary of the HCT: it may be exceedingly
improbable, but hopefully this paper has shown it should nevertheless be kept on the table as we seek to understand
the ongoing empirical mystery of PAN. This point was made in a recent article in Scientific American, for example,
titled It’s time to hear from social scientists about UFOs
. It notes the topic “often evokes talk of a separate, mysterious intelligence that must somehow be
behind the sightings,” and that We need scholars to figure out how to talk to a being with a nonhuman mind. But we
should also examine our assumptions in thinking about and doing research on such intelligence.
It further argues
how easily reason falls into anthropocentrism and cultural bias when dealing with the nonhuman,
citing work by
Bohlmann and Bürger which suggests scientific assumptions around PAN
and NHI tend to be constrained by epistemological limitations that are heavily anthropomorphized. As noted above, the
first main “extraordinary” hypothesis for NHI is often humanoid-like extraterrestrials. They therefore ask, “How to
look for something we have no idea of?” One possibility they suggest are sentient “swarms” (“single-cell organisms
that operate in groups … controlled by a single hive-mind”), but they also note PAN may involve “something else
entirely.” In that respect, as this paper has hopefully demonstrated, we ought to include openness to a
cryptoterrestrial hypothesis in a spirit of curious and genuine enquiry.