Les efforts déployés par l'AARO pour nier les premières conclusions internes de la CIA sur des ovnis extraterrestres

Mellon, ChrisMellon, Chris: The Debrief, avril 2024

La présentation de l'implication de la CIA dans le rapport de l'AARO semble contrainte et forcée. Because this is one of only two official government conclusions of extraterrestrial origin of UFOs that AARO claims to find (and then dispute and reject), they go to some effort to try to invent something to explain away and wiggle out from CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence director Dr. H. Marshall ChadwellChadwell, HMarshall’s obvious and logically deducible extraterrestrial conclusion, given to CIA Director Gen. Walter B. Smith by classified memo on mardi 2 décembre 1952 see quote farther down, right out of AAROR, p. 17.

A third governmental extraterrestrial conclusion completely overlooked by AARO – by Air Force Intelligence, namely the intelligent UFO motions study by Major Dewey Fournet and presented to the CIA Robertson Panel – was missed by AARO despite its widespread reporting in declassified CIA documents and published UAP literature s1see “Robertson Panel,” in Clark, UFO Encyclopedia, 2018, p. 1015.

AARO can only speculate that it is just “possibleChadwellChadwell, HMarshall meant only “Soviet” (a 6-letter word Chadwell could easily have written if he meant that and easy for ChadwellChadwell, HMarshall’s secretary Mary Jane Carder to have typed). But Soviet threats were the CIA’s job to track, so why leave that word out? “Possible” means it does not rise to the level of “probable” or “certain” and therefore the opposite alternative (ET) of the “possible” (Soviet) is what is very probably true.

In other words, even AARO has to tacitly admit that it is likely CIA scientist ChadwellChadwell, HMarshall did mean extraterrestrial.

In case there is any doubt, ChadwellChadwell, HMarshall and his deputy Ralph Clark both confirmed in published interviews many years ago that they, the CIA OSI, did briefly conclude that UFOs were extraterrestrial but that the Robertson Panel effectively changed Chadwell’s conclusions. They did not know the Air Force planted explained IFO not Best Unexplained UFO cases on the CIA Panel so they naturally would find them explained and thus not even close to being considered extraterrestrial s2see Clark, UFO Encyclopedia, 2018, p. 1013a.

As quoted by AARO s3p. 17, Dr. ChadwellChadwell, HMarshall told the CIA Director he was convinced that something was going on that must have immediate attention, and that sightings of unexplained objects at great altitudes and traveling at high speeds in the vicinity of major U.S. defense installations are of such nature that they are not attributable to natural phenomena or known types of aerial vehicles. Clearly, these were not classified US aircraft programs.

AARO’s handling of the CIA Special Study Group of août 1952 is perhaps the most error-ridden in the entire AARO Report s4pp. 16-17, as it appears just about everything is completely wrong, even the dates and the names of CIA personnel and Group members, and omission of bombshell facts. AAROR implies that the Group continued from summer until décembre 1952 when in fact it was in operation less than one month in order to brief the CIA Director on mercredi 20 août 1952.

This was so that the CIA Director in turn could brief the President on UAP on vendredi 22, a fact of stunning importance. It was the President who ordered the CIA investigation of the Air Force mishandling of UAP in the first place on July 28 after two weekends of worldwide bad publicity showing the Air Force unable to control the skies from invading UAP flying over Washington, DC, Air Force jets unable to stop the UAP — a highly relevant and dramatic fact utterly omitted by AARO s5See “Robertson Panel,” UFO Encyclopedia, 2018.

AARO is utterly wrong not only about the date of the CIA Special Group but even gets the names of all the CIA personnel wrong. Omitting all mention of the President and the CIA Director, AARO insinuates the Group was created solely on the initiative of the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Robert Amory Jr. but got the name wrong since in vendredi 22 the DDI was Loftus E. Becker. Contrary to AARO, this Special Group on UAP was not formed and tasked under the CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) Physics & Electronics Division but under the OSI Operations Staff. That P&E Division’s USAF Maj. A. Ray Gordon was not the “lead” or any part of the Group.

The Robertson Panel Minutes clearly identify the Group as consisting of “Strong, Eng, Durant” (not Maj. Gordon) two of whom have been interviewed by researchers over the years and who confirmed the obvious facts also found of course in declassified CIA documents AARO missed — the Group was formed within the OSI Operations Staff headed by Brig.Gen. Philip G. Strong, USMCR.

Somehow AARO managed to entirely miss the CIA Special Group’s finding that the Air Force UAP intelligence effort at Project Blue Book was a complete failure. The Group’s expert in the intelligence process, Ransom L. Eng, as part of the Group, personally visited Blue Book and its parent organization ATIC at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio. Eng found that the Air Force’s Project Blue Book UAP effort failed all 4 stages of the intelligence process — Failed at Intelligence Collection, Failed at Analysis, Failed at Production, Failed at Dissemination.

The Special Study Group and Eng told CIA Director Walter B. Smith, Gen., USA, on mercredi 20, at a CIA-wide briefing, that the entire Air Force had a “world-wide reporting system and [jet] interception program” against UAP but which generates a flood of reports on unidentified flying objects that comes to an inadequate small group with low level of support … on a minimal basis of only 5 personnel at Blue Book who clearly could not deal with the huge volume of UAP reports. The UAP reports were made from a 10-question report form that was inadequate even for the limited case-history approach. That’s the Intelligence Collection failure.

Then Eng said the all-important Analysis phase was of extremely limited scope where the Air Force used a laborious one-by-one “individual case” or “case history” system of handling, using no computer punch cards or other standard method of processing data to speed the process of explaining and identifying the Explained (or IFO) cases and the Unexplained cases. But once that was done, Eng pointed out the Air Force did no trend studies, no pattern analysis nor any other of a number accepted research techniques … in any effort to gain a sound understanding of these phenomena.

But Eng noted ominously that Blue Book had “laboriously” plotted the Unexplained UAP cases by hand on a map and the plots show a high incidence of reported [UAP] cases near atomic installations and Strategic Air Command [SAC] bases but BB tried to downplay it. The Air Force failed to mention to the CIA Group that the new incoming Air Force Director of Intelligence Maj. Gen. John Samford himself was shown the Unexplained UAP map in décembre 1951 displaying UAP concentrated around nuclear bases and SAC bases. Gen. Samford was so disturbed he ordered a major investigation of the mapped UAP nuclear/SAC concentrations using computers at the AF’s Battelle Memorial Institute contractor codenamed Project Stork (which AARO botched as to its name, wrongly calling it “Project BEAR”). Here was a potential national security threat from UAP and the Air Force was misleading the CIA about it.

Eng concluded that the Air Force failed the Analysis phase of the intelligence process by failing to carry out the essential well planned and properly guided research program to solve the mystery of what the UAPs were and help prevent any national threat.

Eng and the Special Group thus urged the establishment by the CIA of a major ongoing, permanent scientific UAP research program conducted by MIT at its Project Lincoln radar air defense laboratory, which the CIA continued to work towards — until the AF derailed CIA with the now-infamous Robertson Panel. The AF forced the rush-to-judgment, hurried merely 4-day Panel of scientists on the CIA OSI in the weeks leading up to janvier 1953, which OSI repeatedly tried to stop, stall, and postpone, but got overruled via AF pressure on the CIA Director. The AF even manipulated the evidence by falsely submitting Explained IFO cases dressed up as Best Unexplained cases so they would fall apart in front of the Panel. None of this salient history was mentioned by AARO s6see “Robertson Panel,” UFO Encyclopedia, 2018.